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LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS. By George
Lefcoe. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1966. Pp. xlix, 1681. $14.50.
A casual inspection of the table of contents of Land Develop-
ment Law gives one the impression that this book is an enormous
intellectual smorgasbord from which teachers of a variety of tradi-
tional law school courses could pick materials to nourish the minds
of their students. For example, a course in the law of "vendor and
purchaser" and "conveyances" could be based on the materials in
chapters 2, 4, 6, and 7, which deal respectively with "Vendors and
Purchasers in the Private Land Markets: The Predevelopment
Stage," "The Post Development Period: Land Sale Contracts and
Deeds," "Recording," and "Title Insurance."' If desired, chapter 8,
entitled "Private Governments: Land Use Controls by Contract,"2
or chapter 4, entitled "Land Finance,"3 or both, could be added to
such a course. On the other hand, a course in "public control of land
use" could be constructed with the materials in chapters 1, 3, 9, and
10, which deal respectively with "Government as Vendor and Pur-
chaser," "Land Development and Public Regulation," "Planning
and Zoning," and "Real Property Taxation." 4 And, such a course
could be expanded to include private land use controls simply by
adding chapter 8, "Private Governments: Land Use Controls by
Contract." 5
It is clear, however, that Professor Lefcoe has planned his book
on the assumption that law students should be presented with "a
representative cross section of the intricate problems and competing
solutions which confront property lawyers" (p. xii), and that he
would object to the traditional division between the "private law"
oriented course in "vendor and purchaser" and "conveyances" and
the "public law" oriented course in "land use controls." Thus, in
the preface to his book, he states:
[T]he attorney for a land developer may need to condition his
client's purchase on the availability of both appropriate zoning
changes and acceptable financing. He should associate the rules of
land sale contracts-the Statute of Frauds, indefiniteness, inade-
quacy of consideration-with the laws of zoning and the practice of
lenders. [p. vi.]
Moreover, a course in property law should not place its whole em-
1. These chapters contain 434 pages.
2. This chapter would add another 202 pages.
3. This chapter would add another 244 pages.
4. These chapters contain 737 pages.
5. This chapter would add another 202 pages.
[794]
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phasis on the role of "private" criteria in shaping official decisions.
Professor Lefcoe thus further notes:
[L]awyers cannot afford to assume that people always act on the basis
of the narrowest possible perception of their own self-interests. We
are members of a multitude of groups and possess a variety of in-
terests that often conflict. The frequent task of the lawyer is to devise
an argument to persuade against self-interest narrowly conceived.
[P. xi.]
Materials on land use planning, zoning, subdivision control, and
urban renewal provide an especially useful basis for a study of the
norms used in resolving land development disputes.
Assuming that it would be desirable to consider all the subject
matters included in Land Development Law in a single course-an
assumption I am inclined to accept-is it possible to do so? The
book, physically, is a monster of 1,618 pages, plus a twenty-four page
bibliography and a thirty-nine page index. In terms of verbiage,
however, the book is not too much longer than the widely used prop-
erty course books by Casner and Leach 6 or Cribbet, Fritz, and John-
son; 7 and it is actually a bit shorter than the recently published
property course book of which I am a co-author.8 Yet even so, the
sheer bulk of Land Development Law creates problems. If it were
adapted to use in the first-year "basic" property course, it could
easily be "covered" in an eight-semester-hour course (a rare com-
modity nowadays), and it could certainly be used in a six-semester-
hour course (more common, but by no means universal) without too
much difficulty. In my judgment, however, the book is too advanced
for use in a first-year course. Hence Land Development Law will
probably be used in second- or third-year courses in most law schools.
And, since a six-semester-hour allotment of time for a second- or
third-year course is hard to come by, it is probable that the book will
actually have to be used as the basis for two three-semester-hour
courses or, possibly, a four-semester-hour course. The latter, in fact,
appears to be the time allotment at Professor Lefcoe's own law school,
where the course is required.9
6. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY (1951), with the 1959 Supplement,
contains 1,388 pages exclusive of tables and index. The pages contain about as much
material as those in Land Development Law.
7. J. CRIMBEr, W. FRITZ & C. JOHNSON, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1966) contains
1,263 pages exclusive of tables and index. Since the pages contain substantially more
material than those in Land Development Law, the total number of words is about
14/15 of the number of words in Land Development Law.
8. 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JtLiN, BAsic PROPERTY LAW (1966) contains
1,199 pages exclusive of tables and index. Since the pages contain considerably more
material than those in Land Development Law, however, the total number of words
in Basic Property Law is substantially in excess of the number of words in Land Devel-
opment Law.
9. The University of Southern California Law School Bulletin for 1965-1967, in
describing the courses available, lists "Land Development II" as a four-semester-hour
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Laying aside the difficulties of fitting a comprehensive, advanced
course in "land development law" into the law school curriculum,
how good a coursebook is Land Development Law? In my opinion,
it is a very good book indeed. The choice of materials, both "legal"
and "nonlegal" is excellent. It is not only comprehensive but well-
designed to stimulate and maintain the interest of law students. As
Professor Lefcoe points out:
Provocative and important inquiry will result from studies which
depict the context in which the lawyer works. Our students are
worldly and want to participate in shaping their surroundings; they
will not pursue a study enthusiastically when its only worldly ref-
erences are the ambiguous and blurred abstractions from old cases
and histories. [p. viii.]
In general, the choice of cases and problems for inclusion in Land
Development Law is excellent, and much of the supplementary text
is superb.10 But there are, of course, some points on which the book
can be subjected to at least mild criticism. I will deal with these
points on a chapter-by-chapter basis.
Chapter 1. The choice of "Government as Vendor and Pur-
chaser" as a starting point is open to question, since most of the land
currently available for development is privately owned and is avail-
able without any need for government intervention through urban
renewal or other public programs for land development or redevel-
opment. It would seem that the subject matter of chapter 2 would
have been a more logical starting point, leaving "public" programs
of development and redevelopment for later treatment on a com-
parative basis.
Chapter 2. This chapter, entitled "Vendors and Purchasers in
the Private Land Markets: The Predevelopment Stage," deals at
some length with the doctrine of specific performance of contracts
course dealing with "[elminent domain; vendor and purchaser; recording; titles; land
security devices; private controls of land use-easements, covenants, equitable servi-
tudes; zoning; subdivisions; controls [sic]; land taxation." This course is required in
the fourth semester of law study. "Land Development I," which is a three-semester-
hour required course in the third semester of law study, is described as including
"[h]istory of real property law; estates; introduction to future interests; restraints on
alienation; concurrent interests (including condominiums and cooperatives); modern
landlord and tenant problems." First-year required courses include a two-semester-
hour course called "The Institution of Property," which is described as including
"[p]roperty as an idea and a process," and "[flunction of law in allocating, protecting,
limiting and legitimating control over natural resources and new forms of wealth."
It might be noted that the University of Southern California Law School Bulletin
for 1967-1969, in describing the courses available, omits "Land Development II"--
presumably because of Professor Lefcoe's departure for the Yale Law School.
10. As the preface indicates (p. xiii), a good deal of this supplementary text is
based on Professor Lefcoe's empirical research into the operation of land development




for the sale of land, but all other aspects of the land-sale contract
(the earnest-money contract, not the installment-sale contract) are
postponed to chapter 4, which deals with the "postdevelopment pe-
riod." The same is true of the material on escrow and delivery and
deeds. And there is no discussion at all of the law relating to options.
Yet all these matters are surely involved in the "predevelopment
stage," when the developer is concerned with the purchase of land. It
can also be argued that title search and recording problems are more
likely to cause serious difficulty to the developer at the "predevelop-
ment stage" than in the "postdevelopment period." Indeed, it is
doubtful whether the problem of marketable title, considered in
chapter 2, can really be understood without some knowledge of the
recording system and its defects-a matter which is not dealt with
until chapters 6 and 7. Land finance is also involved in the "pre-
development stage," both in connection with the developer's pur-
chase of land and the arrangement of a construction loan, but it is
obviously impossible to deal with everything at once. It therefore
seems desirable to postpone the consideration of land finance, as
Professor Lefcoe has done, to a subsequent chapter.
Chapter 3. This chapter, entitled "Land Development and
Public Regulation," is excellent as far as it goes. But with the
emphasis on planning one wonders why a consideration of zoning is
postponed until chapter 9. Zoning is the most widely used form of
public regulation of land development, and one of the major prob-
lems of the land developer at the "predevelopment stage" is likely to
be the obtaining of needed zoning amendments, special exceptions
(or special use permits), or variances. Moreover, the relation of plan-
ning to zoning, which is dealt with in chapter 9, is at least as close
as its relation to subdivision regulation.
In connection with Professor Lefcoe's treatment of "the consti-
tutional and statutory limits to subdivision exactions" in chapter 3-
which is generally excellent-it is unfortunate that there is no men-
tion of three recent cases sustaining subdivision exactions for school
or recreational purposes against attack on constitutional and statu-
tory grounds."" And a fuller treatment of special assessments as an
alternative method of financing subdivision improvements would
have been desirable, since much of the judicial and scholarly think-
ing about subdivision exactions is colored by the obvious analogy
11. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182
(1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 678 (1966); Jordan v. Meno-
minee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
For a good discussion of these cases, see Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CoPFa.L L.Q. 871, 913-21 (1967). It
should be noted that none of these cases is reprinted or discussed in 0. BROWDR,
R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JuLIN, BAsic PROPERTY LAW (1966) or J. CRIgEr, W. FaTZ &
C. JOHNSON, CASES ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1966).
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to special assessments. 12 Special assessments are discussed in chapter
3 in connection with "the use of special districts to pay for utility
installations" (pp. 363-67) 13 but the treatment is not really adequate.
Chapter 4. This chapter, entitled "The Post Development Pe-
riod: Land Sale Contracts and Deeds," contains much material
which, in my opinion, really belongs in chapter 2. I think a chapter
on "the postdevelopment period" should concentrate on those legal
and institutional characteristics of that period which differentiate it
from the "predevelopment stage." Among those characteristics, of
course, are the legal doctrines and institutions involved in the pro-
vision of "permanent financing" for purchasers of developed land.
Chapter 5. This chapter, entitled "Land Finance," is excellent
as far as it goes; however, it seems particularly vulnerable to criti-
cism because of important omissions. Since the chapter is obviously
not designed to provide a substitute for the usual law school course
in real estate mortgages or, more broadly, real estate security, the
criteria for inclusion and exclusion of materials are crucial.
One wonders what criteria led to the inclusion of "equitable
mortgage" problems (pp. 698-715) and the exclusion of problems
arising in connection with mortgage assignments; the exclusion of
all consideration of equitable redemption of mortgages in favor of
a brief treatment of statutory redemption (pp. 782-84, 787-88); the
omission of any substantial treatment of the respects in which a
"trust deed mortgage" differs from an ordinary mortgage;' 4 and
dismissal of the rights and liabilities of grantees who either "assume"
the mortgage debt or "take subject to" it in less than a page of text
notes (pp. 839-40). Moreover, the discussion of the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) insured mortgage loan (pp. 623-27, 630-34) fails to
indicate how the insurance contract protects the mortgage holder
when there is a default, and there is no discussion at all of special
"below market rate" FHA mortgage programs such as the 221(d)(3)
program. Nor is there any treatment of the economics of the land
contract market as compared to the mortgage markets. And, one
wonders why the section dealing with equitable mortgages fails to
raise the most important question likely to arise in modem times:
Why is the equitable mortgage needed if the debtor is solvent, and
what value does the equitable mortgage have if the debtor is insol-
vent and liable to be adjudicated a bankrupt?
Finally, it seems difficult to justify the inclusion in a chapter on
12. See, e.g., Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YAr-E
L.J. 1119, 113641, 1146-52 (1964); Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision,
14 SYPAcusE L. REv. 405, 407-12 (1963).
13. Compare Comment, The Use of Special Assessment Districts and Independent
Special Districts as Aids in Financing Private Land Development, 53 CA". L. Rav. 364
(1965).
14. The brief treatment at p. 780 is quite inadequate.
[Vol. 66
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land finance of a section on "vendor and purchaser in the executory
period" (pp. 715-50)1'-the "executory period" being the period be-
tween the signing of the earnest money contract and performance of
the contract by execution of a deed and mortgage or, alternatively,
execution of a long-term installment land contract. This material
clearly belongs in chapter 4, except for Moses Bros. v. Johnson,"6
which deals with waste by a purchaser in possession under an in-
stallment land contract.
Chapter 6. This chapter, entitled simply "Recording," is ex-
cellent, although (as previously noted) it might better have been
included in chapter 2, dealing with "the predevelopment stage."
Some criticism of the substance of chapter 6, however, can be offered.
The section dealing with the functions of the recording system
overemphasizes its relatively minor function as a revenue producer
(pp. 877-79), while omitting discussion of more important functions
such as preservation of evidence and making the record copies of in-
struments affecting land titles admissible in evidence as "self-proving
documents"-that is, documents which do not require independent
proof of execution and delivery. The section dealing with the chain
of title problem is decidedly inadequate. The leading case on this
problem, Capper v. Poulsen,17 is especially hard for students to
understand unless they are told to assume that the affidavit filed by
Poulsen was not indexed under the name of his grantee, Barnett. A
case more clearly posing the chain of title problem could certainly
have been chosen.18 And the chain of title problems arising from
application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed need more attention
than they get-a one-half page text note (pp. 904-05).
It should also be noted that in chapter 6 mortgages to secure
future advances are considered only in connection with the conflicts
that may arise between the lien of such mortgages and mechanics'
liens (pp. 947-57). While such conflicts are of major importance,
future advance mortgages also come into conflict with other interests.
Hence it would seem that the different legal theories as to the
nature and operation of future advance mortgages and the different
legal principles governing their priority in different jurisdictions
of the purchase money mortgage should be dealt with in any chapter
should be treated.' 9 Further, it would seem that the special priority
entitled "recording." A footnote defining "purchase money mort-
gage" is clearly inadequate (p. 196 n.12).
15. This section includes the following subsection headings: "(a) Devolution on
Death," "(b) Dower," "(c) Risk of Loss and Insurance," "(d) Waste," and "(e) Rents
and Profits."
16. 88 Ala. 517, 7 S. 146 (1890), reprinted in LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 747.
17. 821 Ill. 480, 152 N.E. 587 (1926), reprinted in LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 891.
18. See, e.g., cases reprinted or noted in 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JULIN,
BAsIc PROPERTY LAW 836-57 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Ladue v. Detroit & M.R.R., 13 Mich. 380 (1865); Ackerman v. Hun-
sicker, 85 N.Y. 48 (1881).
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Chapter 7. This chapter, entitled "Title Assurance," is excel-
lent, although some discussion of the constitutional issues raised by
the marketable title legislation 20 would seem to have been in order
and some cases construing and applying the modem state statutes on
quiet title actions21 would have been welcome. Also-and this is
perhaps the major criticism that can be leveled at chapter 7-the
material on statutes of limitation (pp. 986-90) is clearly inadequate
to show the complexity of the adverse possession doctrine, both in
cases where there is a direct attack on a defective paper title and in
cases where the marketability of title is in question.
Chapter 8. This chapter, entitled "Private Governments in Hous-
ing: Land Use Controls by Contract," is an interesting and, on the
whole, successful attempt to pull together the relevant materials on
"licenses, leases, covenants, conditions and easements as means of
establishing and retaining rights in the land of another." Here again,
however, a few criticisms are in order.
One looks in vain in the section dealing with easements by impli-
cation (pp. 1101-13) for materials on easements implied from sub-
division plats showing streets or other "public" grounds, only to
discover a rather tangential reference to such easements in a later
section dealing with easements by estoppel (pp. 1120-30). And in
connection with maintenance assessments (pp. 1138-48) and enforce-
ment of restrictions by non-landowners (pp. 1156-68), one notes with
surprise the omission of Neponsit Property Owners' Association v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank.22 The second hand summary of
Neponsit in a note (p. 1159) is neither adequate nor fully accurate.
The single case2 reprinted under the heading "Affirmative Cove-
nants-Equitable Relief" creates a rather misleading impression as
to the likelihood of equitable relief, since equitable enforcement of
affirmative covenants has been granted in a majority of the cases.24
And the report of Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp.25 is so
severely edited as to make it impossible for the student to discover,
from reading the report, that the consideration for the promise of
The Embossing Company to furnish heat to Nicholson was Nichol-
son's permission (required under the local zoning ordinance) for
Embossing to build a spur track across its own land to the main
railroad track. Hence the student is likely to be mystified when he
20. See, e.g., Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). But see
Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181 (1965).
21. See statutes reprinted in LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 1011-13.
22. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793.
23. Furness v. Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (1960).
24. See Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959), and cases cited
therein. It might be noted that in New Jersey [the locus of Furness v. Sinquett, 60
N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 1455 (1960)] it has consistently been held that affirmative
burdens will not "run with land" either at law or in equity, except when created by
covenants in a lease.
25. 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959), reprinted in LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 1178.
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reads, in the student case note reproduced in part at the end of the
case (p. 1182), that the court failed "to point out that mere consent
to the laying of a track adjacent to one's land does not constitute a
conveyance of any interest in land."
More broadly, one might object that it is hardly accurate to say
that "[o]ne of the open questions in real property law is whether the
technicalities which are said to be necessary in order for a covenant
to run are required only when the covenant is to run at law, or
whether they apply as well when the covenant is sought to be en-
forced only at equity" (p. 1176). Most of the cases either hold, state
by way of dictum, or assume that neither privity of estate between
the parties to the covenant,26 nor a formal agreement under seal, 27
is necessary when a covenant is enforced as an equitable servitude.
Of the four essentials of a real covenant (p. 1171) only the "touch
or concern"28 and "intention of the parties" 29 requirements are im-
posed in equity.
Chapter 9. This chapter, entitled "Planning and Zoning," is a
superb collection of materials dealing with the basic concepts and
the major problems in this area of the law. The choice of cases is
excellent, and my criticisms are minor indeed.
In dealing with the various methods for altering zoning restric-
tions, it might perhaps have been better to consider first straight
"rezoning" by amendment of the zoning ordinance, and then to
compare other methods such as "contract zoning" (usually "rezon-
ing," as a matter of fact), "floating zones," "special uses," and
"variances," instead of putting the material on straight "rezoning"
last (pp. 1297-350). And the treatment of the "special use" (pp.
1297-804) is subject to criticism because of the failure to indicate
that the "special use" (or "special use permit") is really just the
"special exception" (or a variant thereof) which is expressly autho-
rized by section 7 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and by
most current state zoning enabling acts (though not by the Illinois
act applicable to the situation in Kotrich v. County of Du Page).30
Indeed, it would have been a good idea to reprint in the course book
either the Standard Act 3' or a good modern zoning enabling act, or
both.
26. See 2 AMEicAN LAW OF PROPERTY 409-10 (Casner ed. 1952).
27. See 2 id. 404-09.
28. See 2 id. 412-15.
29. See 2 id. 415-21.
30. 19 I1. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601, appeal dismissed, 864 U.S. 475 (1960), reprinted in
LAND DEVELOPMENT LAw 1297.
31. The Standard Act is set out in full, with the draftsmen's notes, in 0. BROWDER,
R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JULIN, BASIc PROPERTY LAW 958-66 (1966). It is also set out in
full, but without the draftsmen's notes, in J. KRASNOWiECKr, OWNERSHIP AND DEVELOP-




Chapter 10. This chapter, entitled "Real Property Taxation,"
appears to be an excellent treatment of that important topic, al-
though I am not really competent to give an informed judgment on
it.
Despite the relatively minor criticisms and reservations expressed
in this review, I would like to reiterate the opinion stated earlier:
Land Development Law is a very good course book indeed. I would
welcome a chance to try it out in the classroom if the arrangement
of courses at my own law school was such as to make this feasible.
Roger A. Cunningham,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan
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